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Abstract
A spatial model of the U.S. dairy sector is used to analyze support 
prices at 75 and 80 percent of parity, supports based on the cost of pro­
duction, a policy of minimal or non-support, and the possibility of in­
creasing dairy imports. Results indicate that the current program of 
parity based price supports could lead to large and increasing federal 
expenditures on dairy products over a five year period, whereas support 
prices based on the full cost of production would imply much lower ex­
penditures . In fact, it is likely that support prices based on the full 
cost of production would be below market prices by 19^0 • Under those 
conditions, it would be possible to increase imports, perhaps as much as 
four times their level in 1976 by 198l> without requiring abnormally large 
federal expenditures. This would provide an opportunity to enhance U . S. 
bargaining power at the multilateral trade negotiations.
The results of the analysis follow from the expectation that the 
parity price will increase much more sharply than the cost of milk pro­
duction. The divergence between parity and cost is in large part due to 
the different weightings assigned to inputs in the two measures, feed 
inputs in particular. Furthermore, productivity gains are taken into 
account in the cost of production but not in the parity price.
Actual results will differ from projections, particularly if pro­
duction costs would increase more sharply than projected due to weather, 
exports, or government feed grains programs, for example.
Introduction
In the fall of 1977, the support floor for manufacturing grade milk 
prices was raised from 80 percent to 82 percent of parity. Representing 
a substantial increase in dairy prices, this action led to concern that 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) dairy product expenditures would 
soar to unacceptable levels. Dairy stocks did build for a while. In the 
fiscal year ending September 30, 1977, net government expenditures on dairy 
products reached $711*5 million. This was not a record, but it was higher 
than the sum of net expenditures in the three previous years. In 1978, 
unexpectedly brisk consumption led to expenditures one—third lower than the 
previous year, accompanied by a decline in concern for the level of support. 
In early 1979, legislation has been proposed to continue supporting prices 
at 80 percent of parity. One proposal in Congress calls for an extension 
through September 30, 1981.
Although the experience with supports at 80 percent of parity has not 
been as bad as expected in the past year, it seems desirable to consider 
the potential impacts of continuing supports at that level for the next 
several years. In this paper, the impacts of such a policy and alternate 
policies, in particular support prices based on cost of production, are 
compared.
Methodology
Impacts of the various support policies are estimated with a spatial 
model of the U.S. dairy sector, referred to as the Dairy Market Policy 
Simulator or DAMPS.I Model components include:
~ supplies of Grade A milk
- supplies of Grade B milk
- processing activities
- demands for fluid (Class I) products, soft (Class II) manufactured 
products, cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk, and miscellaneous hard 
(Class III) manufactured products,
- imports of cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk, and miscellaneous Class 
III products
- commercial stocks of cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk
- government stocks of cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk.
DAMPS evolved from a model of the Federal Order system, known as the 
Federal Milk Marketing Order Policy Simulator or FMMOPS. Details on 
FMMOPS are available in Banker, et. al. (l, 2).
The dairy sector is split geographically into Federal Order areas, state 
regulated areas, unregulated Grade A regions, and Grade B or manufacturing milk 
regions. Each regulated area has a production center, a processing center, and 
a consumption center. Unregulated regions have production centers and consump­
tion centers. Grade B regions have production-manufacturing, import, stocks, 
and consumption centers.
DAMPS is a quarterly model and can simulate from one to five years of 
dairy sector activity. Dynamic elements of the dairy sector are represented 
in DAMPS By the carryover of dairy stocks between quarters and by supply and 
demand being a function of lagged prices. Projected Grade B prices (M-W 
prices) are the basic model input. The Class III price in regulated areas is 
equal to the Grade B price. Class I and II prices in regulated areas are 
based on Class I and II differentials added to the Class III price. Differ­
entials default to values in the base year, 1976, but can be set at any level. 
Retail prices are based on farm level prices and marketing costs or margins. 
Other model data include exogenously specified import levels, desired stock 
levels, the level of exogenous factors affecting supply and demand, and re­
strictions and pricing mechanisms used in regulated markets.
Given a matrix of prices and exogenous factors, quarterly production and 
consumption can be computed in each area or region. DAMPS determines the 
spatial allocation that minimizes marketing costs, using a capacitated network 
algorithm to solve the transshipment problem.
Further details on DAMPS can be obtained from Novakovic (3).
Results and Analysis
A number of changes in dairy support policy have been considered. These 
range from adjustments in the level of parity to which supports are tied under 
the current program to entirely new programs, such as a direct payments plan. 
Other alternatives include support prices based on cost of production, support 
prices with supply controls, support prices with reduced Class I differentials, 
cow culling incentives, and base-excess pricing plans.
2Three sets of experiments with DAMPS are reported here. In the first 
set, support prices are set at 75 and 80 percent of parity (SUP75 and SUP80, 
respectively). The basic legislation authorizing price supports, requires 
prices to be supported between 75 and 90 percent of parity. Currently, 
legislation exists which moves the support floor up to 80 percent. Although 
higher levels have been called for, the 75 and 80 percent levels seem the 
more politically likely alternatives, tinder the current program.
The second experiment, referred to as BASE, approximates a minimum support 
or equilibrium scenario. A set of prices are found which limit government 
purchases to one percent of production. The one percent level is chosen to
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Other experiments were also performed, the results of which are reported 
elsewhere by Novakovic (3). These experiments involve policies of support 
prices set at 90 and 100 percent of parity, support prices with reduced 
Class I differentials, and increasing dairy imports.
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to reflect the need for stocks to satisfy military and welfare requirements 
and the speculative component of commercial stocks that is held by the 
government.
In the third set of experiments, support prices are tied to the cost of 
production. In one experiment (C0ST2), changes in the direct cost of pro­
duction are matched in the support price. In the second experiment (COSTU), 
changes in the full cost of production are matched in the support price.
In both experiments, it is postulated that the average price of all milk is 
supported to the full cost of production, beginning in 1977• Changes In 
costs are added to the Grade B support price.
All other conditions, restrictions and exogenous factors are treated the 
same across all experiments. Exogenous factors are permitted to vary, as 
specified in the base data (see Novakovic (3)), and imports are held constant.
The prices projected as Grade B or Class III prices under these five 
experiments are listed in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 1. In Figure 1, 
simple averages of the quarterly prices under C0ST2 and COST^ are shown as 
annual prices. The reader is reminded that DAMPS allows no deviation from 
these prices, regardless of how realistic or reasonable the situation they 
imply. For this reason, the price used in 1977 under SUP75 is not 75 
percent of parity for that year. The true 75 percent price of $8.20 led to 
an infeasible solution; such that is could not be assumed that is was an 
effective support price. That is, the market price would exceed $8.20 under 
the SUP75 scenario in 1977. The actual 1977 market price was about 30 cents 
higher than the 75 percent support price; this led to the use of $8.55 as a 
1977 market price in SUP75. In addition, the prices in C0ST2 led to an in­
feasible solution starting in 1979, again implying that market prices would 
exceed the COST2 level. Production and consumption under C0ST2 prices are 
mentioned below only for comparison. Otherwise, the C0ST2 experiment is 
not discussed.
This should not be construed as implying that a policy leading to an 
infeasible solution in DAMPS is a bad or undesirable policy, DAMPS gives 
a feasible solution only when prices are such that quantity supplied equals 
or exceeds quantity demanded for all products. An infeasible solution means 
that the prices submitted to the model are less than equilibrium prices•
The purpose of BASE is to help identify where equilibrium might be in the 
dairy sector over the next five years.
Raw milk production^ and total returns over direct cost are affected 
under the five experiments as shown in Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 2 and 3•
As can clearly be seen from the figures, there is a high correlation be­
tween farm prices (Figure l) and production and returns over direct cost. 
Production, farm prices, and returns are initially lower with price supports 
based on 75 to 80 percent of parity than under the BASE or COST plans. By
^ What is called production in this paper is actually milk sold to plants ^ and 
dealers, which excludes milk consumed on the farm and producer-dealer milk 
sales. Although the conceptual distinction is significant, the numerical 
difference between milk sold to plants and dealers and production is slight.
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1978 or 1979* the situation is reversed. In 1981, production, farm prices, and 
returns are lower in the BASE and COST experiments. Compared to BASE results 
in 1981, production is 2.5 percent higher with price supported at 80 percent of 
parity, 1 .3 percent higher with price supported at 75 percent of parity, and 
0.7 percent lower with price price supported at the full cost of production 
(COSTlv). Total returns over direct cost vary more. Compared to BASE results 
in 1981, returns are 35 percent higher at 80 percent of parity, 18 percent 
higher at 75 percent of parity, and 10 percent lower at the full cost of 
production.
The impact of the various support policies on consumers is illustrated in 
Tables ^ through 6 and Figures k through 6. As would he expected, experiments 
having higher prices have lower consumption. Compared to BASE results in 1981, 
fluid products consumption is 0.9 percent lower and manufactured products con­
sumption is 1*.7 percent lower with price supports at 80 percent of parity.
When price supports are set at 75 percent of parity, consumption of fluid pro­
ducts is 0.5 percent lower and manufactured products consumption is 2.6 percent 
lower, than 198l BASE results. Support prices equal to the full cost of pro­
duction result in fluid products consumption that is 0.3 percent higher and 
manufactured products consumption is 1.5 percent higher than corresponding 
figures in the BASE experiment.
Figure 6 illustrates that retail prices increase somewhat faster than 
consumption, in all experiments. Fluid products consumption is fairly stable 
across 1 experiments and manufactured products consumption even declines with 
parity based supports; yet consumer expenditures increase over time in all 
experiments and are higher under experiments with higher prices.
The impact of the various support policies in the government sector is 
shown in Tables 7 and 8 and Figures 7 and 8 . Impacts are measured in terms of 
two variables - net government expenditure and net government purchases as a 
percent of total raw milk produced (called percent net purchases, for brevity). 
Net government expenditure is the cost of new stocks purchased less the value 
of old stocks sold hy the USDA; it is measured in dollars. The difference 
between the quantity of new stocks purchased and the quantity of old stocks 
sold is net government purchases; purchases are measured in pounds on a raw 
milk equivalent (M.E.) basis.
Both measures reveal distinct differences between the policies examined. 
Net expenditure expands rapidly under the parity based support policies. By 
1981, net expenditure reaches $670 million when prices are set at 80 percent 
of parity and $36U million when prices are set at 75 percent of parity.
Although less than actual expenditures in 1977 * these expenditures are much 
greater than net expenditures in 197^ through 1976. Expenditures under the 
BASE experiment, designed to he low, are held to the low level achieved in 
1976. At this level, expenditures would scarcely be noticed by those concerned 
with fiscal outlays. Net expenditures are even lower when prices are supported 
to the full cost of production. In fact, by 1980, government sales exceed 
purchases. The same overall picture is seen when looking at percent net 
purchase. By 1981, net purchases could be as high as 5.9 percent of total 
production with prices at 80 percent of parity, and are U.O percent of total 
milk production at 75 percent of parity.
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In all the experiments discussed above, imports are held constant at 
their "base year (1976) level. If imports are increased at a time when govern­
ment support prices are an effective price floor, the USDA also supports 
world prices, to the extent that the support level is above the world price 
and Import quotas are relaxed. The experiments using cost of production as a 
support price base (C0ST2 and COST1*) used prices that were, for all but the 
first year or two, below prices likely to occur in the absence of supports. 
Under such a scenario, it would be feasible to relax import quotas without 
burdening the support program.
Given the prices and all the other assumptions in C0ST2 and COSTU, three 
quota relaxation policies are explored. In the first group, imports are per­
mitted to increase by 15 percent of the base year imports each year (C0ST2A 
and COST Ha ) . This would mean that imports would double by 1981.. In the 
second group, imports increase by 32 percent per year (C0ST2B and COSTHb ). 
Imports would quadruple by 1981, In the last group, 52 percent of the 1976 
imports are added each year (C0ST2C and COSTCO). At this rate, imports in 
1981 would be 8 times their level in 1976.
It perhaps should be recalled that DAMPS treats imports as an exogenous 
variable. This means that it is assumed that the level of imports specified 
in the six experiments above is indeed the level that would be imported. As 
long as the quota effectively restricts imports, this is a reasonable assump­
tion. It should be recognized, however, that at some point, the quota would 
no longer be effective and imports would not exceed that level, ceteris 
paribus. Experience and the amount of excess dairy supplies in foreign coun-r 
tries indicate that import levels in all of the above experiments are possible.
Results of the C0ST2A and C0ST2B experiments reveal that supporting 
prices to the full cost of production in 1977 and then guaranteeing to meet 
changes in the direct cost of production is still infeasible after 1979, even 
with increased imports at the levels used in C0ST2A and G0ST2B. Because only 
the level of imports varies across each experiment, the only difference be­
tween COSTH and COST^A through COSTCO is the impact on the government sector. 
Table 9 and Figure 9 show net government expenditures among the feasible 
import experiments. Net government purchases as a percent of total milk pro­
duction (percent net purchases) for those experiments are given in Table 10 
and Figure 10.
With the COST2 prices, massive imports, relative to the base year, are 
required to satisfy consumption requirements. If a policy such as that repre­
sented by C0ST2C was adopted it would imply providing consumers with dairy 
products at a declining real cost, at a very low support cost to the USDA.
It would also imply that the nominal returns to dairy farmers1 fixed assets 
would stay constant at the level established at the start of the program, 
thus implying declining real returns. It is unlikely that a C0ST2 type policy 
would be politically viable, if imports were used to keep prices at the support 
level,
COSTU prices are more likely to be accepted politically than C0ST2 prices, 
and, as Figures 9 and 10 illustrate, they could have the added political appeal 
or permitting dairy imports to increase. Dairy quota relaxations could ease 
some pressures resulting from the current round of multilateral trade
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negotiations. Based on COSTUB results, government expenditures could “be held to 
low or moderate levels even when imports are quadrupled by 1981. Net expenditures 
under COSTl+B are about double those under BASE, but they are still relatively 
low. With a policy such as that represented by COST^B, consumers could enjoy 
lower prices than with current programs, but producers could also enjoy increas­
ing returns over direct cost, albeit not as high as returns under the current 
program. The government could enhance their position to bargain for important 
foreigh trade restriction concessions, while keeping support program costs at 
low levels. Opinions would undoubtedly vary, but COST^B could be interpreted 
as representing a bargain for consumers of dairy products, without requiring a 
great sacrifice by dairy farmers or great cost to the USDA.
Going the next step, to COSTUc, would not alter conditions for either con­
sumers or producers. The additional imports are simply absorbed by the USDA.
It may be interesting to note that the results indicate that the cost of a 
program represented by COSTlC to the USDA falls in between the cost of support­
ing prices at 75 and 80 percent of parity, with no change in import policy.
Implications
First, it should be recalled that DAMPS is not designed to answer the 
question: What will prices be?; rather it answers the question: What would
happen if prices are at a certain level? Accepting that the BASE experiment 
is a plausible equilibrium pricing scenario, it can be assumed that support 
prices set at 75 percent of parity or higher will be effective in supporting 
the price of milk above what the price of milk would be in the absence of 
supports. This might not be the case only in 1977* The BASE price in 1977 
is about 8l percent of parity. Prices set at 75 percent of parity are still 
below the BASE price in 1978, but diverge fairly rapidly afterwards. In 1981, 
the BASE Grade B price is 69 percent of parity. Based on this it may be con­
cluded that prices at 80 percent of parity may have been appropriate in the 
last two years, but could lead to large government expenditures if they are 
extended. Even at 75 percent of parity, expenditures could exceed acceptable 
levels.
The cost of production experiment offers even greater insights. As would 
be expected of a policy that increases prices rapidly to meet the full cost of 
production in 1977, expenditures begin at a higher level under this plan. 
However, by 1979 prices under COSTU are slightly lower than under BASE. The 
COST^ plan comes very close to approximating an equilibrium scenario, but, with 
USDA sales exceeding purchases by 1980, under the COST** policy, it must be 
.concluded the support prices based on full cost of production would not be 
effective for long. That is, the results indicate that it is likely that mar­
ket prices would exceed a support price based on the full cost of production by 
1980, given the assumptions in COSTU.
If market prices are above the support price, it would be possible to relax 
import quotas on dairy products. Results of COSTi+B indicate that imports could 
be quadrupled by 1981 at a fairly low CCC cost, by historical standards. Unless 
such a large increase in imports was necessitated by foreign trade policy objec­
tives, imports at half the COST^B level, as in COST^A, or slightly higher would
provide adequate supplies to consumers with virtually no government purchases 
of dairy products. This is not to say that such a policy is advocated. The 
results do indicate that if it was decided that a bargaining chip was needed 
for the multilateral trade negotiations and that relaxing dairy quotas con­
tributed to the overall improvement of domestic economic conditions, then the 
support policy represented by COST^B would provide legislators with an oppor­
tunity to relax dairy quotas without causing large USDA expenditures on the 
support program and without leaving Congress with an indefensible support 
policy.
Whether or not imports could be increased, the difference between parity 
based supports and cost of production based supports should give policy makers 
plenty to think about. The key to the rather startling difference between 
parity based supports and supports based on the cost of production seems to 
lie in the growing divergence between parity prices and the cost of production. 
If parity continues to be used as a base for support prices, the evidence pro­
vided by this research strongly suggests that this divergence be investigated. 
It is possible that an alteration in the parity formula could reduce its de­
clining relevance to dairy prices. Nevertheless, it also seems that cost of 
production should be further reviewed as a base for price supports.
One must, however, be careful not to interpret the results as giving a 
sure sign that the full cost of production can be supported with no exposure 
by the USDA. There are several ways that cost of production could be computed 
and tied to price supports. The particular methods chosen could make a sig­
nificant difference. If the results reported here are indicative of what 
would happen with full cost supports, it seems that there is a high probability 
that farmers would protest against the method used to compute costs of produc­
tion, when the full cost falls short of the market price.
Despite the necessary qualifications noted above, the results lead to the 
following conclusions. Prices supported at 80 percent of parity should be 
expected to lead to large government expenditures within five years, Support­
ing prices at 75 percent would cut those expenditures almost in half. Even 
at 75 percent of parity, the support price would diverge from prices likely 
to occur in the absence of supports or under a minimum support plan. It is 
possible that the full cost of production could be supported at no appreciable 
expense to the USDA. With supports based on the cost of production, it is 
possible that imports could be allowed to increase from two to three times 
their level in 1976 by 198l> without requiring any or much expense by the 
USDA.
-8-
Table 1. Manufacturing Grade Support Prices*
at Five Experimental Levels
BASE SUP75
1977
I 8.90 8.55
II 8.90 8.55
III 8.90 8.55
IV 8.90 8.55
1978
I 9.30 9.20
II 9.30 9.20
III 9.30 9.20
IV 9,30 9.20
1979
I 9.77 9.95
II 9.77 9.95
III 9.77 9.95
IV 9.77 9.95
1980
I 10.27 10.78
II 10.27 10.78
III 10.27 10.78
IV 10.27 10.78
1981
I 10.80 11.67
II 10.80 11.67
III 10.80 11.67
IV 10.80 11.67
SUP80 C0ST2 C0ST4
8.74 8.78 8.88
8,74 8.81 8.91
8.74 8.85 8.95
8.74 8.88 8.98
9.81 8.89 9.31
9.81 8.91 9.33
9.81 8.93 9.35
9.81 8.94 9.36
10.61 8.96 9.62
10.61 8.99 9.65
10.61 9.01 9.67
10.61 9.04 9.70
11.50 9.06 9.97
11.50 9.08 9.99
11.50 9.11 10.02
11.50 9.13 10.04
12.45 9.15 10.30
12.45 9.17 10.32
12.45 9.19 10.34
12.45 9.20 10.35
^Dollars per hundredweight
-9-
Table 2. Total Milk Production Under Alternate
Price Support Policies, in million pounds
BASE SUP75 SUP80 C0ST2 C0ST4
1977 118,552 117,900 118,256 118,398 118,583
1978 119,327 118,996 120,159 118,611 119,418
1979 120,177 120,448 121,815 118,621 119,990
1980 121,045 121,972 123,396 118,641 120,546
1981 121,972 123,578 125,056 118,650 121,076
-1 0 -
Table 3. Total Returns Over Direct Cost
Under Alternate Price Support Policies *
in Million Dollars
BASE SUP75 SUP80 C0ST2 C0ST4
1977 3675.1 3313.0 3500.4 3599.3 3699.8
1978 3985.5 3879.3 4530.0 3795.6 4024.4
1979 4386,5 4577.0 5286.8 i f 4271.6
1980 4696.5 5257.0 6046.4 I f 4412.0
1981 5269.2 6228.3 7115.7 I f 4758.3
u Infeasible solutions were obtained in COST2 after 1978.
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Table 4. Consumption of Fluid Products Under
Alternate Price Support Policies, in Million Pounds
BASE SUP75 SUP80 COST2 COST4
1977 42,709 42,799 42,750 42,731 42,706
1978 42,836 42,894 42,730 42,933 42,821
1979 43,023 42,991 42,787 43,242 43,046
1980 43,203 43,079 42,871 43,542 43,273
1981 43,391 43,170 42,959 43,850 43,513
\
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Table 5. Consumption of Manufactured Products
Under Alternate Price Support Policies,
in Million Pounds*
BASE SUP75 SUP 80 C0ST2 C0ST4
1977 78,181 79,330 78,699 78,407 78,086
1978 78,936 79,240 77,438 80,128 78,821
1979 79,554 79,046 77,277 81,865 79,870
1980 80,171 78,844 77,100 83,568 80,895
1981 80,795 78,710 76,998 85,314 82,019
*
In whole milk equivalent
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Table 6. Consumer Expenditures on All Dairy Products
Under Alternate Price Support Policies, in Million Dollars
BASE SUP 75 SUP80 C0ST2 COST4
1977 22,186 21,799 22,010 22,111 22,221
1978 23,233 23,129 23,811 22,800 23,274
1979 24,411 24,623 25,365 1/ 24,283
1980 25,667 26,266 27,093 y 25,353
1981 26,992 28,033 28,947 y 26,420
— Infeasible solutions were obtained in C0ST2 after 1978.
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Table 7. Net Government Expenditures Under Alternate 
Price Support Policies, in Million Dollars
BASE SUP75 SUP80 C0ST4
1977 98.3 -20.2 43.6 107.1
1978 55.4 14.5 228.5 69.2
1979 51.8 110.8 356.8 15.1
1980 49.0 228.1 503.4 -41.6
1981 49.7 364.1 670.5 -111.7
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Table 8. Net Government Purchases as a Percent of
Total Production Under Alternate Price Support Policies
BASE SUP75 SUP80 C0ST4
1977 1.0 - .2 ,5 1.1
1978 1.0 .4. 2.6 1.2
1979 1.0 1.7 3.7 0.4
1980 1.0 2.9 4.8 -0.4
1981 1.0 4,0 5.9 -1.4
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Table 9. Net Government Expenditures With Support Prices
Based on Cost of 
Increasing Imports,
Production 
in Million
and
Dollars
C0ST4 C0ST4A C0ST4B C0ST4C C0ST2C
1977 107.1 119.0 132.4 148.2 113.5
1978 69.2 93.4 125.2 168.8 22.6
1979 15.1 54.1 113.4 207.0 -27.5
1980 -41.6 15.3 115.0 296.3 -32.1
1981 -111.7 -33.4 124.4 467.7 31.7
-IT-
Table 10. Net Government Purchases as a Percent of
Total Milk Production with Support Prices Based on
Cost of Production and Increasing Imports
C0ST4 C0ST4A________ C0ST4B________ C0ST4C________ COST2C
1977 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1
1978 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 0.5
1979 .4 1.0 1.7 2.4 -0.4
1980 -.4 .4 1.8 3.3 -0.4
1981 -1.4 -0.2 2.1 4.7 0.6
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FIGURE I. MANUFACTURING GRADE SUPPORT PRICES AT FIVE 
EXPERIMENTAL LEVELS
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FIGURE 2. TOTAL MILK PRODUCTION UNDER ALTERNATE PRICE 
SUPPORT POLICIES, IN BILLION POUNDS
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FIGURE 3. TOTAL RETURNS OVER DIRECT COST UNDER
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FIGURE 4. CONSUMPTION OF FLUID PRODUCTS UNDER
ALTERNATE PRICE SUPPORT POLICIES, IN
BILL ION POUNDS
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FIGURE 5. CONSUMPTION OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
UNDER ALTERNATE PRICE SUPPORT POLICIES,
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FIGURE 6. CONSUMER EXPENDITURES ON ALL DAIRY 
PRODUCTS UNDER ALTERNATE PRICE 
SUPPORT POLICIES, IN BILLION DOLLARS
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FIGURE 7. NET GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES UNDER
ALTERNATE PRICE SUPPORT POLICIES,
IN MILLION DOLLARS
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FIGURE 8. NET GOVERNMENT PURCHASES AS A PERCENT
OF TOTAL PRODUCTION UNDER ALTERNATE
PRICE SUPPORT POLICIES
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FIGURE 9. NET GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES WITH SUPPORT
PRICES BASED ON COST OF PRODUCTION AND
INCREASING IMPORTS, IN MILLION DOLLARS
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FIGURE 10. NET GOVERNMENT PURCHASES AS A PERCENT 
OF TOTAL MILK PRODUCTION WITH SUPPORT 
PRICES BASED ON COST OF PRODUCTION AND 
INCREASING IMPORTS
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